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Abstract
Is social capital always important for economic growth? A number
of recent micro studies suggest that interpersonal trust and social cap-
ital will have its greatest impact on economic performance when court
institutions are relatively weak. The conventional wisdom from macro
studies, however, is that social capital is unconditionally good for growth.
On the basis of the micro evidence, we outline an investment game be-
tween a producer and a lender in an incomplete-contracts setting. A key
insight is that social capital will have the greatest e¤ect on the total sur-
plus from the game at lower levels of institutional strength and that the
e¤ect of social capital vanishes when institutions are very strong. When
we bring this prediction to an empirical cross-country growth regression,
it is shown that the marginal e¤ect of social capital (in the form of inter-
personal trust) decreases with institutional strength. Our results imply
that a one standard deviation rise in social capital in weakly institution-
alized Nigeria should increase economic growth by 1.8 percentage points,
whereas the same increase in social capital only increases growth by 0.3
percentage points in strongly institutionalized Canada.
1 Introduction
Though arguably highly interrelated, research on the impacts of social capital
and formal institutions on economic development have mainly emerged as two
distinct elds. In the former literature, trust, networks, social norms, and as-
sociational activity are believed to be central aspects of successful economies.
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In the institutional literature, formal rules of the game such as property rights
laws and the strength of courts are regarded as critical for development. We
argue that there is an important disconnection between results from micro stud-
ies of social capital - which indicate that various self enforcement mechanisms
are more prevalent when contracting institutions are weak - and macro stud-
ies where social capital-related measures are hypothesized to have a uniform
positive impact on economic performance.
In this article, we outline a unied theoretical framework of the relative
importance of social capital and formal institutions in a simple principle-agent
investment model featuring a producer and a lender in an incomplete contract-
setting. The probability of contract enforcement by an exogenous court is our
major indicator of institutional strength and social capital enters our model
as an extra socialor intrinsicpayo¤ to both players from acting trusting or
trustworthy.1 The major insight from our model is that social capital tends
to have its greatest positive impact on the total monetary surplus from the
game (economic growth) at lower levels of institutional development and that
the positive impact eventually vanishes if institutions become strong enough.
This basic prediction is then brought to the macro level and tested in a
cross-country growth regression. In accordance with our hypothesis, our results
show that the marginal impact of our proxy for social capital (interpersonal
trust) decreases with the quality of formal institutions. More precisely, our
results imply that a one standard deviation increase in social capital leads to a
1.10 percentage points increase in the growth rate among countries at the 25th
percentile of institutional strength, whereas the e¤ect among countries at the
75th percentile of institutional strength is only 0.36 percentage points.
Our approach combines two major types of building blocs: (1) The literature
on the macroeconomic e¤ects of formal institutions and (2) the extensive em-
pirical literature on the micro and macro e¤ects of social capital. Starting with
institutional economics, this tradition emphasizes how formal institutions such
as those regulating the strength of property rights, the constraints against the
executive, and the power of courts are fundamental determinants of long-run
growth. Following in the footsteps of Douglass North (1981, 1990), a number of
seminal contributions have emerged over the recent decade such as Knack and
Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005), and Banerjee and Iyer (2005). These studies all show that
1Our analysis is therefore not concerned with the formation and impact of di¤erent kinds
of networks, which is another important line of research on social capital.
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good formal institutions are strongly associated with great prosperity, although
joint endogeneity problems are still an important econometric issue in the lit-
erature. Unlike our study, this literature also aims at explaining why some
countries have better formal institutions than others. None of these studies,
however, attempt to quantify the e¤ect of informal institutions such as social
networks or interpersonal trust. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) di¤erentiate be-
tween court (contracting) and property rights institutions, but do not study
the impact of private enforcement mechanisms.
The empirical cross-country macro literature on social capital includes sem-
inal contributions by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001).2
The paper most closely related to ours is Zak and Knack (2001) who regress
economic growth on both levels of interpersonal trust and on an index of for-
mal institutional strength in a cross-section of 41 countries, most of which are
industrialized. The authors nd that interpersonal trust is positively and signif-
icantly related to growth when holding formal institutions constant. However,
they do not explore the possibility of non-linear e¤ects of trust that depend on
di¤erent levels of formal institutions. Similarly, Tabellini (2006) nds a positive
e¤ect of interpersonal trust on growth in European regions using an instrumen-
tal variable approach, but neglects any di¤erential e¤ects depending on formal
institutions.3
The overall picture in micro studies is mixed but nevertheless suggests that
social capital has a larger e¤ect on economic performance when formal insti-
tutions are weak. Table 1 shows a summary of some of the more well-known
studies. Although a full review is beyond our ambitions, we will briey mention
a few articles. In a study of transition economies in Eastern Europe, John-
son et al. (2002), nd that when institutions are weak, rms are more likely
to engage in relational contracting, i.e. trust-based interactions, whereas the
support of courts appears to be more important in relatively more developed
countries. For poor developing countries, Bigsten et al. (2000) and Fafchamps
and Minten (2002) have conrmed the same basic logic that social capital has
a strong role when property rights and courts are working imperfectly.4 Study-
2See Durlauf (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) for a critical discussion of this line
of research.
3Tabellini uses data from 69 regions in 8 Western European countries and includes country
xed e¤ects. The instruments used are literacy rate around 1880 and constraints on the
executive in the years 1600-1850. However, he does not include any measures of formal
institutions at the regional level.
4Johnson et al (2002) show that e¢ cient courts create trust and help to start and develop
social interactions which are then sustained by more personal relationships.
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ing provincial data from Italy, Guiso et al. (2004) nd that the e¤ect of social
capital is stronger in provinces where legal enforcement is weaker. Social capi-
tal also appears to be more important among the less educated, implying that
trust is more important when contracts are regarded as too complex. Miguel
et al (2005) show that conventional measures of initial social capital are statis-
tically unrelated to subsequent industrial development in Indonesia during the
1985-95 period. They instead attribute the rapid Indonesian development to an
improved institutional environment.
We argue that there is an important missing link between results from micro
and macro studies of social capital. In particular, the micro studies highlight
how the e¤ect of social capital depends on the level of formal institutions, while
the macro studies assume that the e¤ect is linear and independent of the level
of formal institutions. In order to rationalize the micro results and test their
validity on the macro level, we suggest a simple theoretical framework for the
relationship between social capital and institutions and then proceed by testing
the implications of the model using cross-country data.
We further borrow insights from behavioral economics and a large body of
experiments showing that economic agents in contractual settings often do not
behave in ways that are rational from a purely economic point of view, but
rather by trusting others or behaving trustworthy. More specically, trust can
be seen as a calculation under uncertainty whereby trust is an expectation of
trustworthiness and trustworthiness, in turn, is due to reciprocity (for surveys,
see Camerer, 2003; Ostrom and Walker, 2003). Alternatively, agents may trust
others and behave trustworthy because they have social preferences for altruism
or other unconditional social factors (for a survey, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2002).
Our model is most closely related to the latter perspective, by making the
simplest possible case and assuming away uncertainty about agentspreferences
and payo¤s.
In summary, we argue that our article o¤ers two specic contributions to the
literature. Firstly, our model rationalizes the empirical regularity that social
capital matters for investment mainly when institutions are relatively weak.
Secondly, our article is the rst one to demonstrate empirically that the marginal
impact of social capital on economic growth is declining in institutional strength.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and
derive the key results for the relevance of social capital and institutions. In
section 3 we display the empirical specications and present the results. Section
4 concludes the exposition.
4
2 The Model
In order to provide an aid for thinking about the e¤ects of institutions and social
capital on growth, we present in this section a simple model of an investment
game between a Lender and a Producer, inspired by the empirical literature
referred to above. The purpose of the model is to provide a micro-foundation
for our hypotheses regarding the interrelationships between social capital and
institutions at the macro level.
2.1 The Investment Game
The model is a sequential, principal-agent investment game with a representative
Lender and Producer and a Court as described in extensive form in Figure 1.
We have chosen to analyze an investment problem since it is standard to regard
investment as a key engine of economic growth, but similar types of situations
also apply in supplier-producer and buyer-seller situations with trade credit. We
also believe that this type of game is quite similar to the scenarios described in
the empirical literature referred to above. The game is one of perfect information
and players are assumed to be risk neutral and non-cooperative. There are no
other agents in the economy.
In the initial Credit Stage, Lender chooses whether to lend the required
amount of capital k or not. If she chooses not to, the game ends, no production
occurs, and payo¤s are uL = uP = 0 for Lender and Producer respectively.
This is the autarkicor status quo situation where agents remain in subsistence
production.
<Figure 1 about here>
In the second Contract Stage, the players have entered a market economy
where a lending of k units of capital has occurred and production has been
undertaken. Producer considers the option of fullling the credit contract which
would result in Producer receiving a net monetary payo¤ of P > 0 plus a non-
monetary social benet of cooperation sP > 0. Likewise, Lender would in this
case get the credit k in return and in addition get a monetary compensation
L > 0 and social payo¤ from being trusting sL > 0. This is clearly the socially
optimal situation in the sense that it maximizes aggregate welfare and total
monetary payo¤s.
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The si-terms capture rewards stemming from the trust and trustworthiness
among our representative agents. These extra payo¤s are a kind of social reward
such as a strengthened reputation or the moral satisfaction from living up to
a norm towards cooperation.5 The payo¤s only materialize if the player in
question has shown a trustworthy behavior. If Producer reneges he forgoes this
social payo¤ whereas Lender retains it throughout the game if she has provided
the credit. We further assume that social payo¤s are fully observable by both
players.
The conventional payo¤s from the investment P and L have been agreed
upon in the contract. L could take the form of an interest payment to Lender
or indeed as prot-sharing of some form. We leave it open here what type of
nancing arrangement the two players have agreed upon, although we could
have easily made such a choice endogenous.
The other option for Producer is to renege on the contract, by which is
meant that he retains the compensation to Lender L that was stipulated by
the contract and repudiates Lenders claims to a repayment of k. The dispute
may then end up in court in the third stage. This is the Lawsuit Stage, where the
Lender decides whether to take the reneging Producer to court or not. Should
the Lender choose not to go to court the Producer keeps the total monetary
payo¤ from the project L + P while we assume that he cannot benet from
the credit that he has failed to repay.6 The Lender is left with a social payo¤
sL and with a loss of his credit.7 If Lender chooses to go to court, the court will
enforce the contract with a probability , which is our indicator of the strength
of contracting institutions.  is simply meant to reect how strong courts are
and is not intended to imply any form of strategic interaction between the Court
and the Producer. The cost of going to court is covered by a loser-pays-principle,
according to which the losing party pays a ne of d to the court. If the contract
is properly enforced, Lender gets her credit in return and receives a net payo¤
of L + sL while Producer receives P   d.
If the contract is not enforced by the court, Producer ends up with L +
P . Lender receives no compensation and no repayment of the credit and thus
5See for instance Guth and Ockenfels (2005) and Francois and Zabojnik (2005) for similar
intrinsic rewardsfrom cooperation.
6We make this assumption so that a failure to act trustworthy is also associated with a kind
of waste in terms of total monetary payo¤s. This is not a critical assumption but simplies
derivations.
7Another possibility, often observed in reality, is that Lender o¤ers a renegotiation at this
point, o¤ering Producer not to be socially disgraced, perhaps in return for the credit and a
smaller part of the net surplus from the investment.
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receives a net utility of  k   d + sL from lending. Obviously, many Lenders
would require some form of collateral for the loan, but for simplicity we abstract
from that in this simple setting. We also leave out aspects like the degree of
contract complexity or additional social costs of a negative court ruling.
Using the payo¤ structure above, we can easily derive the following results:
Result 1: The best response strategies of the players and the SPNE of the
game are determined by the following conditions:
Credit stage
(Lender)
:
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Lend if any of the following conditions applies:
(i) L  sL +  (L + k + d)  k   d  0
(ii) sL   k  0
(iii) Producer will fulll
Not lend if none of (i), (ii), or (iii) applies.
Contract stage
(Producer)
:
(
Fulll if F  sP +  (L + d)  L  0
Renege otherwise
Lawsuit stage
(Lender)
:
8><>:
Not to Court if sL   k  0 and
 ((L + k + d))  d  0
To Court otherwise.
The key expressions in Result 1 are L = L(sL; ; L; k; d) and F = F (sP ; ; L; d)
which determine whether the socially optimal equilibrium (Lend, Fulll) is ob-
tained or not. Obviously, Lenders willingness to lend and Producers willingness
to fulll should increase with the social payo¤s from trustworthy behavior sL
and sP and from the strength of court institutions . Social capital and institu-
tions are substitutes in the sense that either increases sL and sP or an increase
in  could make L or F positive. The size of the investment, given by k; a¤ects
Lender in the sense that she becomes more cautious and less willing to lend as
k increases. Note further that Lenders willingness to lend will, as expected, be
positively associated with her investment returns L, whereas these will have a
negative inuence on Producers willingness to fulll since a higher level makes
it more tempting to try to appropriate this payo¤.
Disregarding all other variables for a moment and assuming that sL = sP =
s < k, we can write L(s; ) and F (s; ). Let us imagine a situation where court
institutions are at a low level low such that L(s; low) < 0 and F (s; low) < 0,
which means that monetary payo¤s are (0; 0). There is then a s > 0 such that
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either L(s + s; low) = 0 or F (s + s; low) = 0; which means that Lender
supplies the credit and production occurs. In other words, at low levels of , it is
quite possible that an increase in social capital s leads to economic development.
However, at a high level of court strength high such that L(s; high)  0 and
F (s; high)  0, the socially optimal equilibrium is already obtained and an
equivalent increase s will have no e¤ect. Hence, in this model, social capital
increases will have a stronger positive e¤ect when institutions are weak.
2.2 A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the last point further and achieve a focus on the essentials,
let us discuss the following example:
Example 1: L = P = 3; k = 2, d = 1, sL = sP = s.
This simplication allows us to analyze the relationship between the two
remaining variables in the system; the strength of court institutions  and the
social payo¤ s. The example assumes a relatively small investment with a
relatively high total payo¤ and a payo¤/investment ratio of (L + P ) =k =
6=2 = 3. We believe that this particular example might illustrate a typical
decision in credit-constrained small-scale agricultural or manufacturing sectors
in a developing country.8
As was mentioned in the introduction, we do not attempt to explain how
court institutions and social capital have emerged in the rst place, but we
recognize that they could both be driven by the same underlying set of forces
(history, geography, ethnic fractionalization, etc) and are likely to be positively
correlated.9 Let us think of s as being proportional to the average level of social
capital in society, i.e. the total stock of interpersonal relationships and trust
that has accumulated over the years. We assume that the higher the average
level, the greater the payo¤ from acting trustworthy. Equivalently, if the average
level of trust is small, people will not be expected to cooperate and the social
opportunity cost of reneging (s) should be relatively small.
The potential outcomes of this game are follow from Result 1 above. It is
immediately clear from inspection of the game that the goodsubgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of (Lend, Fulll) with payo¤s (3 + s; 3 + s) can be
obtained if either the social payo¤ s or the strength of courts  are high, or
8We will later discuss the implications of assuming a much lower payo¤/investment ratio.
9See for instance Congdon Fors and Olsson (2007) for a model of endogenous institutional
change.
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if both are high. More formally, standard backward induction shows that the
socially optimal solution will be the SPNE if Lender in the rst Credit stage
nds it worthwhile to lend despite the risk of contract breach. This is always
the case when L = s+6  3  0. Lender will in any case provide the credit as
long as s  2, in accordance with (ii) in Result 1.
Lender will further lend if she is certain that Producer will fulll, which is
determined in the second Contract stage. Producer fullls if the expected utility
from reneging is lower than the certain utility of fullling the contract, which
will be the situation if F = s + 4   3  0: Producer will not renege in this
case since he knows that Lender would then take him to court which would be a
worse outcome than fullling. The game would then end at the socially optimal
SPNE.
If Producer has reneged so that the game has gone to the third Lawsuit
stage, then Lender will only choose the Not to Court-response if the social
payo¤ from investment is higher than the level of physical investment (s  2)
and institutions are very weak (6  1): Otherwise, she will always take the
case to court.
The four di¤erent scenarios are outlined in Figure 2, which is drawn i ; s
space. The A-area shows the input requirement setof court strength and
social capital for the (3 + s; 3 + s) equilibrium to apply. The line dened by
 = 3 s4 shows the combinations of  and s where Producer is indi¤erent about
reneging or fullling (s + 6   3 = 0). The curve is negatively sloped and
linear, indicating that in this setup social capital and formal institutions are
perfect substitutes. The equivalent line for Lender is given by  = 3 s6 in the
s 2 [0; 2)-interval. In the B-area are the combinations where the players end
up in court. The area dened by   16 and s  2 makes up the C-are where
Producer reneges but Lender will not go to court. Since  and s in reality tend
to be correlated, it is rather unlikely that an economy could end up here. The
D-area, lastly, hosts combinations where  < 3 s6 and s < 2, which yields the
outcome with no investment (0; 0).
<Figure 2 about here>
The main point of the gure is to illustrate intuitively how the e¤ect of
an exogenous increase in social capital can depend on the level of institutional
strength. The four arrows in the A,B, and D-areas show equally large increases
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in social capital.10 In the A-area, an increase in s has no e¤ect since the players
are already in the good equilibrium. In fact, at all levels   34 , Producer
is deterred from breaking the contract and the level of social capital will not
matter for the outcome. This might be thought of as equivalent to a rst-best
outcome which would always be in place if institutions were perfect.
Two arrows originate in the D-area. An increase in s of the magnitude
outlined in the arrows will have di¤erent e¤ects depending on the exact ex ante
circumstances. The lower placed arrow shows that higher social capital may
not be enough to push the economy into a better equilibrium. As mentioned
above, we do not think that this scenario with a very low  and a relatively
high s is often observed in reality.11 The upper arrow originating in the D-
area shows that beginning at a higher level of court strength can make all the
di¤erence. However, even though the level of court strength generally matters
for the e¤ect of a subsequent improvement in social capital, a very large increase
beyond approximately s = 3 would be enough to deter Producer from cheating
at any level of . In the B-area, nally - where Lender supplies the credit,
Producer reneges, and the contract is settled in court - an increase in social
capital is very likely to lead to the good equilibrium. The main insight from
the gure is thus that the impact of increases in social capital will very much
depend on the strength of formal institutions.
Some implications of our example are also shown in Figure 3, where we have
depicted the relationship between the total monetary investment surplus from
the credit deal (L+P ) and the level of social capital. The vertical axis might
thus be considered as roughly equivalent to economic growth in this two-player
world. We see that when court institutions are very strong (for example  = 56 ),
there is no relationship between growth and social capital. If institutions are at
intermediate level  = 12 + , where  is an innitesimally small number, the
players will initially be in the court scenario with an expected aggregate payo¤
of approximately 4, whereas an s > 1 will induce the players to end up in the
good equilibrium. There is a non-linear, positive relationship between growth
and social capital when institutions are very weak (  = 18 ), but s must be quite
high in order to increase growth.
10We recognize that the e¤ect of exogenous increases in social capital also will depend on
the level of institutional strength.
11Such a scenario might perhaps be observed in countries where the state has more or less
collapsed and where social bonding has taken its place, as in Somalia in the 1990s. Such
countries will, however, not be included in our empirical analysis.
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<Figure 3 about here>
Is the main implication driven by our assumption of a very high payo¤/investment
ratio? If we altered the example and assumed instead k = 10 and L = P = 1
so that the ratio fell from 3 to 0.2, what would happen then? It might be argued
that such levels are more common in advanced economies. The result would be
that the F -curve would determine the outcome and there would only be two
possible equilibria; the Not Lend -solution and (Lend,Fulll).12 The equivalents
of the B and C-regions in Figure 2, associated with lending despite contract
breach, would not exist. However, the same basic pattern would emerge in
the sense that an increase in social capital could induce a shift from the bad
equilibrium directly to the good equilibrium, but only if institutions are weak.
In summary, the very simple framework employed here gives at least three
insights. To begin with, our model has the feature that formal institutions
and social capital can be substitutes in the pursuit of the growth-maximizing
equilibrium. This resultis however more or less imposed by the setup of the
game. More interestingly perhaps, the model also shows that at high levels of
institutional strength, social capital can be irrelevant for the growth outcome.
Thirdly, at low and intermediate levels of institutional strength, increases in
social capital might have a positive e¤ect on the total payo¤ from investment.
For these cases, there is a (discontinuous) positive relationship between social
capital and growth. In a condensed form, the model thus implies that the impact
of an increase in social capital should decrease with the level of institutional
strength. In the next section, we demonstrate that this prediction also holds at
the macro level.
3 Empirical Evidence
Both our model and our overview of the micro literature indicate that the e¤ect
of social capital on economic performance will be nonlinear and depend on the
quality of institutions. Likewise, the e¤ect of institutions on economic perfor-
mance will di¤er between low-trust countries and high-trust countries. In this
section we will use econometric tools to provide further support for this line of
theory. To keep our investigation comparable to the focal papers in the litera-
ture on social capital and growth, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack
(2001), we employ a standard cross-country Barro-style growth model. Besides
12Lenders L-curve would be entirely outside the F -curve and would thus be irrelevant.
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comparability with previous research this has two additional advantages - we
can use what may be the best proxy available for social capital, interpersonal
trust from World Values Surveys (WVS), and yet have su¢ cient variation in
institutional quality. The growth regression technique has its well-known draw-
backs (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001) but even for the sceptic it can point to
interesting patterns of correlation and the results are straightforward to inter-
pret.13 The basic variables include measures of initial income, investment, and
human capital and to these we add the nexus of social capital and institutions.
3.1 Model and data
The econometric models we employ will be variations on(
(i) g row thi;1995 2005
(ii) investment rate2000
)
= 0+1initial incomei+2investment pricesi+3human capitali
+4social capitali+5institutionsi+6social capitaliinstitutionsi
+errori:
Our predictions regarding the signs of the coe¢ cients of interest are that 4; 5 >
0 but 6 < 0. Where possible we will use initial values as regressors to mitigate
concerns of reversed causality.14 In our main regressions we use growth in real
per capita GDP and life expectancy from the World Bank (2006a) and initial
income and investment prices from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006).15 In-
terpersonal trust is coded from WVS data as the weighted share of respondents
answering that most people can be trustedwhen asked Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful
in dealing with people?.
Interpersonal trust is an imperfect measure for social capital, but there is
no such thing as a perfect measure for the norms of a society. In our model we
pick one aspect whereby social capital can a¤ect economic performance that
individuals gain a positive utility from acting trusting and honestly. We expect
that the e¤ect on utility will be di¤erent in di¤erent societies, not because people
13 In the words of Lant Pritchett: "Growth regressions are incredibly useful in providing a
general empirical background of stylized facts about the world." (2001:275)
14All specications are estimated with OLS unless we explicitly state otherwise.
15By using life expectancy instead of average years of schooling like Knack and Keefer (1997)
and Zak and Knack (2001) we are able to include six more countries in our sample (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Malta, Nigeria, Romania and Russia).
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are di¤erent but the norms that structure their actions are. Where the norms
for trusting and honest behavior are stronger more people will act trusting and
honestly, ceteris paribus. When more people are acting trusting and honestly
we will see a larger fraction of the respondents answering that most people can
be trusted, giving the country a higher score on interpersonal trust.16
In our main specications we use Quality of Government in 1995 from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as the measure of institutional qual-
ity. Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in our
main specications are presented in tables 2 and 3. Quality of Government is
the average of ICRGs measures of corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy
quality, all of which are arguably related to the risk and cost involved in trying
to enforce a contract. Ideally, we would use a direct measure for quality of
contracting institutions since this would take us even closer to our theoretical
investment game, but to our knowledge no such measure is available for a large
enough sample for 1995 or earlier. The World Banks (2006b) measures for the
number of procedures involved in, as well as the number of days required for,
and the cost of enforcing a contract, comes very close to the concept of contract-
ing institutions but using them is inviting severe problems of reverse causality.
That said, in the appendix we show that our ndings are robust to using these
measures instead of Quality of Government.
3.2 Results
The central results from the growth regressions are presented in table 4. In
equation (4.5) interpersonal trust and institutions enter positively and their
interaction term enters as negative and all three are estimated with high pre-
cision. Comparing specication (4.5) with specication (4.4) and (4.2) we see
that the introduction of the interaction term increases the estimated coe¢ cients
of interpersonal trust, and a straightforward interpretation is that the growth-
enhancing e¤ect of more interpersonal trust when institutions are at a low level
is underestimated in (4.2) and (4.4).17 The signicant interaction term means
16Zak and Knack (2001) use values on interpersonal trust from as late as 1995 to explain
growth between 1970 and 1992, and this raises concerns of reversed causality. Nevertheless,
due to sample size considerations we are also forced to include some countries where data
on interpersonal trust was not available untill in 1996 or 1997. When available we use inter-
personal trust measured between 1990 and 1995. Then we include countries where trust was
measured in 1996, 1997, and between 1981-89, which gives us 8 additional countries (Bulgaria,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
17 Institutional quality and trust are correlated (a bivariate correlation of 0.72) and tests
show that we have multicollinearity in the model. Institutional quality is even more correlated
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that the marginal e¤ect of interpersonal trust will be di¤erent at di¤erent levels
of institutional quality. The average growth rate in per capita GDP between
1995 and 2005 in the sample of countries included in the growth regression is
2.42 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.44 percentage points. At the 25th
percentile of institutional quality the marginal e¤ect of a one standard deviation
increase in interpersonal trust is 1.10 percentage points higher annual growth in
GDP/capita, while it is 0.68 percentage points higher at median institutional
quality and 0.36 percentage points at the 75th percentile.18
The other side of the coin is that the marginal e¤ect of an improvement
in institutional quality also will depend on the level of interpersonal trust. A
one standard deviation increases in institutional quality at the 25th percentile
of interpersonal trust implies 1.17 percentage points higher annual growth in
per capita GDP, while the corresponding gures at the median and at the 75th
percentile of interpersonal trust are 0.91 and 0.53 percentage points respectively.
Clearly, countries with low institutional quality have the most to gain from
better social capital and countries with low levels of social capital has the most
to gain from improvements in institutional quality.
To investigate the e¤ects on investment directly the same regressors as in the
growth regression are used but the investment rate from World Bank (2006a)
is used as regressand.19 The result from this exercise is presented in table 5
where neither interpersonal trust nor institutions enter signicantly when they
are included by themselves or together. When we include both of them as well
as their interaction in specication (5.5) they get the expected signs and the
estimates are statistically signicant. Just as was the case for the growth rate
the positive e¤ect of social capital on the investment rate is higher at lower
levels of institutions, and the positive e¤ect of institutions is higher at lower
levels of social capital. The average investment rate in 2000 for the countries
included in regression (5.5) is 22.31 percent of GDP, with a standard deviation
of 3.93 percentage points. At the 25th percentile of institutional quality the
marginal e¤ect of a one standard deviation increase in interpersonal trust is
with initial income and life expectancy (0.82 and 0.89 respectively), illustrating that drop-
ping variables simply due to high correlation would result in a theoretically crippled model.
Furthermore, we do not think that this is hurting our results considering that the results are
fairly robust to the changes in variables and sample size we have tried.
18Zak and Knack (2001) estimated that a standard deviation increase in social capital
would increase annual growth by "nearly" 1 percentage point. Thus, while their estimate
does not take the di¤erential e¤ects stemming from di¤erences in formal institutional quality
into account, it is on the same order of magnitude as ours.
19The investment rate correctly termed the gross capital formation in percent of GDP which
consists of outlays on xed assets and inventory investments.
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2.67 percentage points higher investment rate, while it is 0.63 percentage points
higher at median institutional quality and 0.98 percentage points lower (sic) at
the 75th percentile. This negative gure could be the result of our restricted
OLS set-up rather a genuine e¤ect, but it is nonetheless clear that the e¤ect
will not be the same for all countries.
A one standard deviation increase in institutional quality at the 25th per-
centile of interpersonal trust implies 3.16 percentage points higher investment
rate, while the corresponding gures at the median and at the 75th percentile
of interpersonal trust are 2.24 and 0.81 percentage points respectively. That
the estimated e¤ect on the investment rate seems too moderate to fully explain
the e¤ect on the growth rate is in perfect order. First, it would be a gross
oversimplication to assume that institutions and social capital a¤ected growth
only via more investments, and that it was so is not something we would ad-
vocate. Second, the measure for investment rate is a measure of the quantity
of investments rather than the potentially more important aspect of the quality
of investments. It is a fairly safe assumption that we will see positive e¤ects
on growth from a higher quality of investment, such as a smaller fraction be-
ing directed to activities that are not primarily prot generating (monitoring,
insurance, security, etc.).
Does our result depict a genuine relationship? We have performed a variety
of robustness tests such as instrumenting for social capital and institutions to
make larger samples possible, dealing with measurement errors, and yet avoid
problems of reverse causality. We also try changes in basic variables like human
capital, investment, income, social capital and institutions, inclusion of new
conditioning variables such as ethnic fractionalization and legal origins, and so
on, and our results are generally stable. For details we refer to the tables and
discussion in the appendix of Ahlerup et al (2007).
Is it backwardness in the form of low income, rather than weak institutions,
that gives a high return to social capital? Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and
Knack (2001) interact initial income and trust and get a signicant and negative
coe¢ cient when regressing growth 1980-1992, and both growth and investment
share 1970-1992 respectively. Whereas Knack and Keefer (1997) propose that
this implies that trust is more needed where contracting institutions are weak
(without providing any evidence that this is the mechanism that makes the in-
teraction term negative), Zak and Knack (2001) argue that the result implies
that backwardness is more of an advantage in high-trust countries. The latter
argue that this mechanism nds further support in the fact that initial income
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becomes nonsignicant once the interaction of initial income and trust is in-
cluded. When we interact trust with income instead of with institutions we also
obtain a negative and signicant interaction term.20 However, we believe that
the reason that initial income turns nonsignicant (in one case only marginally
so) could well be that the interaction term introduces severe multicollinearity
in the model, as indicated by very high variance ination factors, both in the
growth regression and in the investment rate regression.21 Thus, while we do
not aim to explicitly refute Zak and Knacks argument that formal institutions
[...] increase growth in part by building trust(2001:316), our evidence indicates
that formal institutions directly determine the e¤ect of trust on growth. With
our estimated direct mechanism whereby formal institutions and social capital
a¤ect growth and investment we believe that we have presented a stronger case
for di¤erentials in the e¤ects of interpersonal trust.22
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides new insights into the current debate about the roles of
social capital and institutions in economic development. Arguing that there is
a missing link from micro studies to macro studies of social capital, it presents
a simple theoretical framework and cross-country evidence showing that the
e¤ect of social capital on economic growth, as well as on the investment rate, is
nonlinear and dependent on the quality of formal institutions. More specically,
it shows that social capital matters the most when formal institutions are weak
and almost ceases to matter when institutions are strong.
For example, a one standard deviation increase in social capital is estimated
to increase the growth rate by 1.8 percentage points in Nigeria but only by 0.3
20See specications (A6.8) and (A6.9) of table A6 in the appendix for more details.
21The highest VIF values are reported for the interaction term. The variance ination
factor for the interaction term is 237.63 in the growth regression (A6.8) and 261.88 for the
investment rate regression (A6.9), see the appendix for more details.
The corresponging values for specication (4.5) is 50.00 and for specication (5.5) 37.22.
A rule-of-thumb says that VIF values over 10 indicates severe multicollinearity, which means
that multicollinearity is a potential problem in all these specications and that one should be
cautious before boasting the result that some variables do not enter as statistically signicant
22 In an attempt to nd out which mechanism is the stronger one we included both the
interaction of income and trust and the interaction of institutions and trust. In our growth
regression the result is that neither of them enters signicantly, but when investment rate is
the dependent variable the interaction between trust and institution continue to be estimited
with precision. One should not overinterpret the results from this kind of exercise but a
reasonable interpretation is that if anything the level of formal institutions rather than the
level of income matters for the e¤ect of trust on economic performance.
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percentage points in Canada, which is in sharp contrast to earlier cross-country
studies that argue that social capital always improves economic growth. This
implies that present attempts at building social capital creates, if successful, a
strong pro-growth potential for poor countries with bad institutions. Concerns
have been raised that social capital is waning in the western world and that
this will have economic consequences. The ndings presented in this paper
imply that as long as the formal institutions are kept strong these concerns
are premature. Though the Canada-Nigeria example should be regarded as
an illustration, the general results are highly robust to a number of di¤erent
specications in the basic variables.
The World Bank has made large e¤orts at promoting better formal insti-
tutions in developing countries and also, in recent years, begun focusing on
building social capital as well. E¤orts aimed at building social capital is con-
ducted in community-level projects. However, the extent to which these e¤orts
have been successful is rather unclear (World Bank, 2005). Our results indicate
that much could be gained by making these projects work in areas with poor
institutions.
Furthermore, much of the scholarly debate evolves around social capital and
formal institutions as either mainly substitutes or complements. The result of
this paper suggests that the relationship is mainly about substitution. However,
the paper assumes away any dynamic process between the variables. The deeper
determinants as well as the evolution of the relationship over time are still
largely unresolved issues and provide potential avenues for fruitful research,
both theoretical and empirical.
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Table 1: Relevant studies on social capital and institutions. 
Author(s) Agents Social Capital 
measure(s) 
Institutional 
measure(s) 
Relevant Findings 
Beckman and Roger 
(2004) 
Hog farmers in two 
Poland 
Dependence on buyer; 
duration of business 
relationship; buyer 
specific investments 
Farmers’ preception of 
court strength 
Farmers are unwilling to take cases to court when the 
measures of social capital are high  
Beugelsdijk and 
Smulders (2004) 
Citizens of 54 European 
regions 
Density of associational 
activity; importance of 
family and friends. 
None Bridging social capital (associational activity) is positively 
related to economic growth whereas bonding social 
capital ( family ties, etc) is not.  
Bigsten et al. (2000) Manufacturing firms in 
6 African countries 
Length of business 
relationship. 
None Renegotiations of broken contracts are helped by (trust 
creating) long-term relations. Better institutions may 
encourage risk taking and therefore also lead to more 
recourse to courts in case of contract breach. 
Fafchamps and Minten 
(2002) 
Agricultural traders in 
Madagascar 
Number of relatives in 
agricultural trade;  
traders known; and 
potential informal 
lenders 
None Positive effect on firm productivity for better connected 
traders. Social capital lowers transaction costs.  
Grootaert and Narayan 
(2004) 
Households in 4 rural 
communities in Bolivia. 
Membership in local 
associations. 
“Effectiveness and 
universality of municipal 
government” 
Social capital matters more for the poor than the non-
poor. Social capital has a positive effect on welfare only 
in the more weakly institutionalized communities.  
Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2004) 
Households in Italy Electoral turnout, blood 
donation and trust (as 
measured by World 
Value Surveys). 
Mean number of years it 
takes to complete a 
first-degree trial. 
More social capital implies a more frequent use of 
checks, more investment in stocks a apposed to cash and 
more institutional rather than informal credit. The effect 
is stronger in areas with weaker legal enforcement.  
Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) 
Firms and customers  in 
5 East European 
countries  
(Relational contracting?) Stated belief that courts 
can enforce contracts. 
Trust-based interaction (“relational contracting”) more 
likely when institutions are weak.  
Krishna (2001) Villages in rural India. An index created 
labour-group 
participation, 
assessments on the 
cooperative attitude, 
and trust, solidarity and 
Various variables 
measuring the agency 
power: how strong are 
the caste leaders; local 
government; patron-
client links; political 
Social capital is beneficial for development only if it is 
activated by agency power (i.e. needs some minimum 
level of institutions).  Social capital without agency power 
does not help development.  
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reciprocity. parties’ power; village 
councils and the 
capacity of young and 
educated leaders.  
McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999) 
Managers of 
manufacturing firms in 
Vietnam 
Percent of relationships 
involving community 
sanctions and networks 
None Social capital is important since courts and private 
property rights are weak. Loss of future business 
opportunity is not an important sanction. Instead, 
scrutinization of potential clients, community sanctions, 
and renegotiation are commonly used.    
Miguel, Gertler and 
Levine (2005) 
Districts in Indonesia Relative expenditures on 
festivals and ceremonies 
and a subjective 
assessment on the 
traditional level of ethic 
and mutual cooperation. 
A number of measures 
of formal community 
groups. 
None Initial level of social capital does not predict subsequent 
industrial development.  
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Table 2: Variable descriptions 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Growth Annual growth in GDP per capita 1995-2005 
InitInc Log GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Laspeyres), Penn 
Inst. /Quality of Government Quality of government, ICRG 
InvPrice Price level of investment , PPP, Penn 
InvRate (Penn) Investment Share of RGDPL in 1995, Penn 
LifeExp Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
Trust (v.1) Interpersonal trust in WVS survey 1990-95+96,97,81-89, imputed 
Trust (v.2) Interpersonal trust in WVS survey 1990-95+96-99,81-89, imputed 
  
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
For countries and variables in spec (4.5): 
variable N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Growth 46 2.42  1.44 -0.36 7.87 
InitInc 46 9.23 0.85 6.85 10.29 
InvPrice 46 86.91 30.65 33.85 171.16 
LifeExp 46 72.05 6.86 45.18 79.54 
Trust 46 0.32 0.16 0.05 0.66 
Inst. 46 0.76 0.21 0.36 1.00 
 
For countries and variables in spec (5.5): 
variable N Mean Std dev Min Max 
InvRate 61 22.31 3.93 13.69 32.76 
InitInc 61 9.28 0.85 6.98 10.78 
InvPrice 61 67.06 23.47 17.63 137.50 
LifeExp 61 72.89 6.89 43.78 81.08 
Trust 61 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.66 
Inst 61 0.68 0.21 0.31 1.00 
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Table 4: Social capital, institutions, and growth 1995-2005 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) 
Dep. Variable gr9505 gr9505 gr9505 gr9505 gr9505 
InitInc -0.280 -0.695 -1.700 -1.504 -1.608 
 (0.34) (1.27) (2.97)** (2.87)** (3.31)** 
InvPrice -0.016 -0.024 -0.028 -0.029 -0.023 
 (2.69)* (3.12)** (3.68)** (4.21)** (3.44)** 
LifeExp 0.036 0.024 0.050 0.039 0.052 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.93) (0.79) (1.13) 
Trust  6.668  4.028 15.896 
  (5.41)**  (3.14)** (3.59)** 
Inst   8.021 5.500 8.728 
   (5.94)** (3.76)** (4.90)** 
Trust*Inst     -14.143 
     (2.78)** 
Constant 3.857 7.053 10.827 10.567 7.594 
 (2.01)+ (3.46)** (4.89)** (5.26)** (3.54)** 
N 46 46 46 46 46 
R2 0.15 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.70 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. In (4.1) robust standard errors are used. In all regressions InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 
1995, while Trust is Interpersonal Trust(v.1) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 1995. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Social capital, institutions, and the investment rate in 2000. 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) 
Dep. Variable InvRate InvRate InvRate InvRate InvRate 
InitInc 0.277 0.122 -0.640 -0.639 -1.952 
 (0.24) (0.10) (0.47) (0.46) (1.60) 
InvPrice -0.037 -0.038 -0.042 -0.042 -0.010 
 (1.21) (1.25) (1.38) (1.36) (0.36) 
LifeExp 0.163 0.164 0.144 0.144 0.144 
 (1.42) (1.42) (1.25) (1.23) (1.44) 
Trust  1.865  -0.142 55.616 
  (0.44)  (0.03) (4.33)** 
Inst   5.414 5.475 30.728 
   (1.19) (1.10) (4.39)** 
Trust*Inst     -73.752 
     (4.56)** 
Constant 10.352 11.202 16.927 16.936 9.491 
 (1.57) (1.62) (1.97)+ (1.96)+ (1.25) 
N 61 61 61 61 61 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.35 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
In all regressions InvRate, InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 2000, while Trust is Interpersonal 
Trust(v.2) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 2000. 
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Figure 1: The investment game 
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Figure 2: Investment game equilibria under varying strengths  
of court institutions and social capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between total monetary payoff (growth) 
and social capital under varying levels of court strength. 
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Robustness analysis
Among the more important problems with growth regressions in general is that
there is a phletora of possible explanatory variables (Sala-i-Martin, 1997 and
Brock and Durlauf, 2001) and that possible parameter heterogeneity is not
taken care of carefully enough (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). While the latter
problem is the raison dêtre of this paper the former is in essence impossible
to avoid, but we do what we can by testing alternative specications. The
more specic problem of robustness of the econometric work on social capital
is discussed in Durlauf (2002), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004), and Beugelsdijk,
de Groot, and van Schaik (2004). In the latter the ndings in Knack and Keefer
(1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) are scrutinized in several ways and it is argued
that while the latter study is fairly robust the former is not and that this is due
to di¤erences in sample size rather than omitted variables. Our sample is larger
than any of theirs.
Since it is not unlikely that both interpersonal trust and institutions are
measured with error, may be correlated with possible omitted variables that end
up in the error term, and since we would like to be able to obtain a larger sample,
which requires including post-1997 values, we reestimate specication (4.5) with
IV methods in specications (A1.2) and (A1.3) of table A1. The instruments
used in (A1.2) and (A1.3) are valid since the overidentifying restrictions cannot
be rejected, but they are on the border of being weak following the critical
values in Stock and Yogo (2002).1 The solution is to use LIML which is more
1The instruments used are are legor_uk (British legal origin), legor_so (Socialist legal
1
reliable when instruments are weak.2 Equation (A1.2) and (A1.3) conrm the
ndings in equation (4.5) and (A1.1). Testing show that the exogeneity of the
instrumented variables can be rejected which means that the OLS estimates are
biased.3
We have the same concerns for the investment rate regressions as for the
growth regressions so we reestimate specication (5.5) with IV methods in spec-
ications (A1.5) and (A1.6) of table A1. That the magnitude of the estimated
coe¢ cients increase when we use IV methods implying that the OLS estimates
su¤ered from measurement error driven attenuation bias, while a Hausman test
of the instrumented variables shows that they are exogenous, which implies that
OLS would be consistent. We present the 2SLS and LIML results for complete-
ness.
In table A2, A3, and A4 we try di¤erent proxies for our basic variables: (1)
investment - the result is robust to using gross capital formation as share of GDP
from the World Bank (2006), investment rate as share of GDP from Heston et
al. (2006), and telephone mainlines from World Bank (2006); (2) human capital
- the result is robust to using average years of schooling and school enrolment,
both from World Bank (2006); (3) initial income - the result is robust to using
non-logged values and values from World Bank (2006); (4) interpersonal trust -
the result is robust to using a variety of periods and sample sizes for interpersonal
trust from WVS (2006); (5) institutions - the result is robust to using risk of
expropriation 1982-97 from the PRS, quality of public institutions in 1982 from
ICRG, bureaucratic delays 1972-1995 from BERI, and the number of procedures
involved in, as well as the number of days, and the cost of enforcing a contract
from the World Bank, as well as a linear combination of the three. We also
test for measures of corruption, the social infrastructure index and government
antidiversion policies from Hall and Jones (1999) and get the same results (not
origin), abslat (Distance from equator), and distcr (Mean distance from coast or river). See
table A1 and table A9 for more information.
2We cannot use the often cited F<10 rule of thumb (Staiger and Stock, 1997) since we
have more than one endogenous variable. In the terminology of Table 1 and 2 in Stock and
Yogo (2002) we have n=3 (endogenous) and K=4 (instruments) and we accept a 10% 2SLS
bias (compared to 15% which is used for the rule of thumb). Table 1 do not list values for
n=3 and K<5, but the critical F-value for the 2SLS bias with n=3 and K=5 is 6.61, and the
value for K=4 would be lower. Since the lowest rst stage F-value for our equation (A1.2) is
7.12 we could conclude that we do not have weak instruments. Table 2 lists critical values
for 2SLS size but do not include n>2, so for the sceptic we present LIML estimates as well.
Stock and Yogo (2002) argues that if instruments are weak LIML is better than 2SLS, since
the former is median unbiased in presence of weak instruments.
3We test the overidentifying restrictions, and nd that instruments are valid, and testing
of the exclusion restriction shows that OLS estimates will be inconsistent.
2
reported). Since the various measures are available for samples of di¤erent sizes
this can also be seen as a mild test of the robustness of the results to di¤erent
samples.
In tables A5 and A6 we present some of the controls for other conditioning
variables that we have performed, and these include proxies for social distance
(fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003)) and proximate causes of unrest
(polarization from Reynal-Querol, 2006), as well as proxies for historical factors
such as state antiquity from Bockstette et al. (2002), legal origin and identity of
past colonial power, distance from the equator, government share of GDP and
openness to trade as share of GDP, and the main result remains standing and
the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients are remarkably stable.
In (A6.4) to (A6.7) we show how the e¤ects of investment prices and in-
vestment ratio, as well as the e¤ect of initial income, change as we introduce
trust and institutions. The coe¢ cient for investment ratio falls and eventually
becomes nonsignicant while we see the opposite trend for initial income and
investment prices. One interpretation of this is that the e¤ect of trust and
institutions on growth does go via a higher investment ratio, and that the ben-
et of relative backwardness and low investment prices is conditional on the
institutional framework.
Finally, in table A7 we restrict our sample by excluding countries with very
high or very low values on institutions and income and nd that the results
are mostly robust to these smaller samples with less variation (see also table
A3, specications (A3.5) and (A3.6), for the same exercise with trust). We
also nd that these results seem to hold also in the very small sample of 21
OECD countries for which we have data on our variables, even if the estimated
coe¢ cients seem unreasonably high. This could shed light on the conicting
ndings in Helliwell (1996) of a negative association between social capital,
measured both as trust and as associations, and productivity growth 1962-89 in a
sample of OECD countries and in Knack (2001) of a positive correlation of trust
and investment in the OECD, since the failure to include relevant interaction
terms and other omitted variables easily makes regressions very sensitive.
In Table A8 we list all countries that are included in specication (5.5) along
with their score on interpersonal trust, institutional quality, as well as which
income group they belong to. The table also lists the countries included in
specications (4.5), (A3.5), and (A3.6), the latter two specications based on
excluding countries with low trust, and both low and high trust respectively.
What is evident is that the OECD countries and Upper Middle Income countries
3
(based on World Bank classications) are overrepresented in our sample, and
that the lower income countries are underrepresented. This may not be too big a
problem since the main di¤erence in e.g. level of trust between di¤erent income
groups is mainly between the OECD and the rest. Following the World Bank
classications the mean value for interpersonal trust in our sample is 0.42 in
the OECD, 0.24 among the Upper Middle Income countries, 0.21 among Lower
Middle Income countries, 0.24 among the Low Income countries (5 observations),
and 0.20 among High Income, non-OECD countries (2 observations).
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 Table A1: IV Estimations for Growth 1995-2005 and Investment Rate 2000. 
 
 (A1.1) (A1.2) (A1.3) (A1.4) (A1.5) (A1.6) 
Dep. Variable Growth Growth Growth InvRate InvRate InvRate 
Est. Method  OLS 2SLS LIML OLS 2SLS LIML 
InitInc -0.452 -1.224 -1.412 -1.952 -1.820 -1.941 
 (0.61) (0.82) (0.73) (1.60) (0.95) (0.95) 
InvPrice -0.036 -0.010 0.001 -0.010 0.014 0.018 
 (4.00)** (0.40) (0.04) (0.36) (0.36) (0.44) 
LifeExp -0.014 0.009 0.023 0.144 0.148 0.149 
 (0.18) (0.08) (0.15) (1.44) (1.29) (1.26) 
Trust 20.656 81.121 102.852 55.616 79.729 86.135 
 (5.23)** (2.39)* (2.09)* (4.33)** (1.91)+ (1.85)+ 
Inst 7.466 28.040 35.223 30.728 41.577 44.549 
 (2.82)** (1.87)+ (1.68)+ (4.39)** (1.98)+ (1.91)+ 
Trust*Inst -20.445 -95.135 -122.915 -73.752 -112.338 -121.241 
 (4.02)** (2.16)* (1.93)+ (4.56)** (2.06)* (1.98)+ 
Constant 4.369 -7.798 -13.162 9.491 0.400 -0.755 
 (1.40) (0.69) (0.84) (1.25) (0.03) (0.05) 
N 61 60 60 61 60 60 
R2 0.46 -0.52 -1.38 0.35 0.24 0.20 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. In (A1.1) robust standard errors are used. In (A1.1), (A1.2), and (A1.2) InitInc, InvPrice, and 
LifeExp are from 1995. In (A1.4), (A1.5), and (A1.6 ) InvRate, InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 
2000. Trust is Interpersonal Trust(v.2) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 2000. Instrumented variables 
are: Trust, Inst, and Trust*Inst. Instruments are legor_uk legor_so abslat distcr.  Spec (A1.2): First stage F-
values are 11.90 for Trust, 7.12 for Inst, and 12.05 for Trust*Inst. Sargan’s test of overidentification of all 
instruments: P-value=0.18472. Wu-Hauman test for exogenous regressors: P-value= 0.00346. Spec (4.3): 
First stage F-value: same as (A1.2). Anderson-Rubin’s test of overidentification of all instruments, P-
value= 0.23032. Spec (A1.5): First stage F-values are 9.10 for Trust, 6.91 for Inst, and 9.94 for Trust*Inst. 
Sargan’s test of overidentification of all instruments: P-value= 0.27626. Wu-Hauman test for exogenous 
regressors: P-value= 0.40179. Spec (A1.6): First stage F-value: same as (A1.5). Anderson-Rubin’s test of 
overidentification of all instruments, P-value= 0.27951. 
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 Table A2: Changes in Basic Variables. 
 
 (A2.1) (A2.2) (A2.3) (A2.4) (A2.5) (A2.6) (A2.7) (A2.8) (A2.9) 
Dep.Variable. Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
InitInc (Penn) -1.608 -1.757 -1.733 -2.160 -2.342 -1.676 -1.608   
 (3.31)** (4.16)** (6.59)** (4.20)** (4.74)** (2.93)** (3.31)**   
       -1.047  InitInc (World Bank) 
       (2.89)**  
        -0.000 InitInc (Penn, not logged) 
        (3.66)** 
InvPrice -0.023 -0.017 -0.025    -0.023 -0.016 -0.020 
 (3.44)** (1.99)+ (5.37)**    (3.44)** (1.80)+ (2.95)** 
   0.039      InvRate (World Bank) 
   (1.28)      
InvRate (Penn)     0.018     
     (0.64)     
     -0.004    Telephone mainlines 
     (2.14)*    
LifeExp 0.052   0.096 0.106 0.107 0.052 0.048 -0.003 
 (1.13)   (1.95)+ (2.08)* (2.38)* (1.13) (0.98) (0.11) 
 0.147        Average years of schooling 
 (1.26)        
  0.031       Secondary school enrollment 
  (3.75)**       
Trust 15.896 16.514 15.512 18.953 20.340 18.239 15.896 13.782 14.794 
 (3.59)** (3.29)** (3.88)** (3.90)** (4.23)** (3.90)** (3.59)** (3.01)** (3.42)** 
Inst 8.728 9.317 8.508 8.253 8.881 9.291 8.728 7.495 7.739 
 (4.90)** (5.09)** (6.01)** (3.90)** (4.29)** (4.84)** (4.90)** (4.32)** (4.68)** 
Trust*Inst -14.143 -15.636 -14.543 -17.783 -19.618 -15.903 -14.143 -11.401 -11.158 
 (2.78)** (2.66)* (3.53)** (3.18)** (3.58)** (2.89)** (2.78)** (2.18)* (2.24)* 
Constant 7.594 10.796 10.643 6.955 8.046 2.825 7.594 2.293 -1.254 
 (3.54)** (3.80)** (6.20)** (2.80)** (3.27)** (0.86) (3.54)** (1.13) (0.53) 
N 46 40 42 46 46 46 46 46 46 
R2 0.70 0.72 0.76 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.70 0.68 0.71 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In all regressions InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995, while Trust is 
Interpersonal Trust(v.1) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 1995. 
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 Table A3: Changes in Social Capital Definition and Sample. 
 
 (A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3) (A3.4) (A3.5) (A3.6) 
Dep. Variable  Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
InitInc -1.392 -1.465 -1.475 -1.318 -1.416 -1.207 
 (2.98)** (3.05)** (3.06)** (2.72)** (2.87)** (2.00)+ 
InvPrice -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 
 (3.24)** (3.66)** (3.61)** (3.16)** (3.42)** (3.15)** 
LifeExp 0.035 0.047 0.044 0.037 0.039 0.026 
 (0.81) (1.05) (0.97) (0.82) (0.83) (0.48) 
Inst 9.790 8.324 8.684 10.128 10.246 8.728 
 (5.51)** (3.20)** (3.46)** (5.37)** (4.45)** (2.61)* 
Trust 17.438 16.868 17.083 17.755 22.573 17.771 
 (3.75)** (2.59)* (2.68)* (3.33)** (3.11)** (1.79)+ 
Trust*Inst -17.105 -15.094 -15.428 -17.948 -21.229 -16.203 
 (3.24)** (2.04)+ (2.16)* (2.95)** (2.75)** (1.46) 
Constant 6.244 6.966 7.047 5.351 5.244 5.604 
 (2.81)** (2.60)* (2.66)* (2.16)* (1.95)+ (1.80)+ 
Trust 
(version) 
(v.2) (v.3) (v.4) (v.5) (v.1) (v.1) 
Sample All available All available All available All available Trust>p10 Trust>p10 & 
Trust<p90. 
N 51 38 37 51 40 34 
R2 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.71 0.54 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In all 
regressions InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995, Inst. is Quality of Government in 1995, , while Trust is 
Interpersonal Trust (v.x). See Table A9. (variable description for exact coding. Trust>p10 means that countries with a 
trust value less than the 10th percentile is removed from the sample.  
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 Table A4: Changes in Institutional Measure. 
 
 (A4.1) (A4.2) (A4.3) (A4.4) (A4.5) (A4.6) (A4.7) (A4.8) 
Dep. Var. Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
InitInc -1.525 -1.057 -0.494 -1.048 -3.400 -2.818 -3.306 -3.446 
 (2.64)* (1.36) (0.59) (1.27) (3.83)** (5.23)** (3.48)** (6.68)** 
InvPrice -0.017 -0.015 -0.029 -0.016 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.003 
 (2.35)* (1.72)+ (2.58)* (1.58) (0.18) (0.33) (0.01) (0.35) 
LifeExp 0.041 0.050 -0.005 0.028 0.212 0.206 0.241 0.220 
 (0.80) (0.80) (0.08) (0.35) (2.58)* (2.95)** (2.41)* (3.58)** 
Trust 21.225 17.783 23.124 16.947 5.751 5.895 5.032 5.150 
 (2.41)* (3.91)** (4.00)** (2.57)* (3.74)** (2.22)* (3.01)** (2.33)* 
Inst 0.983 0.417 1.060 1.896 1.821 1.969 2.049 3.762 
 (3.44)** (1.79)+ (2.74)* (1.66) (4.33)** (2.03)* (4.63)** (4.19)** 
Trust*Inst -1.834 -1.469 -3.151 -4.455 -3.835 -5.901 -4.543 -8.141 
 (1.88)+ (2.71)* (3.17)** (1.83)+ (3.02)** (1.76)+ (3.53)** (2.80)** 
Constant 5.202 4.857 2.725 5.104 17.162 12.403 14.758 17.383 
 (1.72)+ (1.41) (1.08) (1.33) (3.89)** (3.65)** (3.47)** (4.87)** 
Trust (version) (v.1) (v.1) (v.1) (v.1) (v.5) (v.5) (v.5) (v.5) 
Institutional 
Measure 
Risk of 
Expropriation, 1982 
- 1997 
Quality of Public 
Institutions, 1982 
Bureaucratic 
delays, 1972 - 
1995 
Contract 
Enforceability, 1972 
-1989 
Cost of contract 
enforcement 
Days for contract 
enforcement 
Procedures in 
contract 
enforcement 
Composite contract 
enforcement 
institutions 
N 46 39 38 28 62 60 60 60 
R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.48 0.54 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
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 Table A5: Conditioning Variables. 
 
 (A5.1) (A5.2) (A5.3) (A5.4) (A5.5) (A5.6) (A5.7) (A5.8) 
Dep. Variable  Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
InitInc -1.367 -1.559 -1.502 -2.159 -2.228 -1.708 -1.527 -1.545 
 (2.89)** (3.33)** (2.94)** (3.71)** (4.00)** (3.07)** (2.84)** (3.01)** 
InvPrice -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.019 -0.022 -0.024 -0.017 
 (3.74)** (3.65)** (3.49)** (2.62)* (2.70)* (2.94)** (3.21)** (1.93)+ 
LifeExp 0.011 0.018 0.036 0.098 0.116 0.059 0.045 0.055 
 (0.23) (0.39) (0.71) (1.91)+ (2.26)* (1.16) (0.84) (0.94) 
Trust 14.495 15.015 16.511 13.684 13.208 16.574 15.378 14.258 
 (3.41)** (3.51)** (3.64)** (3.04)** (2.95)** (3.39)** (2.98)** (2.81)** 
Inst 7.951 8.790 9.085 9.117 9.620 9.124 8.153 7.366 
 (4.60)** (5.13)** (4.87)** (4.76)** (5.25)** (4.42)** (3.43)** (3.26)** 
Trust*Inst -12.732 -12.986 -14.820 -12.227 -11.923 -14.969 -13.375 -12.179 
 (2.61)* (2.64)* (2.85)** (2.40)* (2.36)* (2.63)* (2.29)* (1.86)+ 
Constant 9.468 9.820 7.699 8.968 7.710 7.775 7.898 7.097 
 (4.31)** (4.21)** (3.56)** (4.05)** (3.13)** (3.46)** (3.27)** (2.55)* 
Control 
Variable(s) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
Ethnic 
Polarization 
Religious 
Polarization 
State Antiquity Colonial 
dummies 
Legal Origin 
Dummies. 
-1.474 -1.183 -0.467 -0.340 0.596 -0.284 - - Coefficient of 
control (2.28)* (2.04)* (0.71) (0.61) (1.07) (0.42)   
N 46 46 46 41 41 45 46 46 
R2 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.72 
Absolute value of t statistics in parenthese, s+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The colonial and legal origin dummies can be found in Table A9.  
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 Table A6: More Conditioning Variables, Effect on Investment and Income-Mediated Social Capital. 
 
 (A6.1) (A6.2) (A6.3) (A6.4) (A6.5) (A6.6) (A6.7) (A6.8) (A6.9) 
Dep. Variable  Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth InvRate 
InitInc -1.778 -1.606 -1.556 0.032 -0.394 -1.188 -1.371 -0.357 3.138 
 (3.73)** (3.26)** (3.24)** (0.05) (0.75) (2.24)* (2.70)* (0.56) (1.97)+ 
InvPrice -0.019 -0.023 -0.024 -0.016 -0.023 -0.028 -0.023 -0.023 -0.004 
 (2.86)** (3.19)** (3.61)** (1.64) (3.21)** (4.17)** (3.48)** (3.39)** (0.12) 
LifeExp 0.059 0.051 0.048 -0.004 -0.013 0.010 0.030 0.020 0.127 
 (1.33) (1.11) (1.05) (0.05) (0.24) (0.21) (0.63) (0.44) (1.21) 
Trust 14.158 15.972 15.879  6.595 4.305 14.524 35.585 170.097 
 (3.25)** (3.51)** (3.63)**  (5.70)** (3.46)** (3.25)** (3.13)** (3.76)** 
Inst 7.356 8.781 8.392   4.813 7.817 4.810 9.553 
 (3.97)** (4.66)** (4.73)**   (3.31)** (4.18)** (3.50)** (2.07)* 
Trust*Inst -12.990 -14.225 -13.925    -12.274   
 (2.63)* (2.73)** (2.77)**    (2.37)*   
0.027         Distance from Equator 
(1.98)+         
 -0.002        Government share of GDP 
 (0.10)        
  0.005       Openness as share of GDP 
  (1.43)       
   0.080 0.076 0.054 0.038   InvRate (World Bank) 
   (2.03)* (2.55)* (1.98)+ (1.43)   
Trust*InitInc        -3.374 -18.037 
        (2.79)** (3.78)** 
Constant 8.555 7.633 7.406 1.964 5.225 8.821 6.754 1.416 -21.899 
 (4.03)** (3.46)** (3.50)** (0.75) (2.55)* (4.14)** (3.08)** (0.38) (1.70)+ 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 61 
R2 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.23 0.57 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.29 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, %. In (A6.1) to (A6.8) InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995, while 
Trust is Interpersonal Trust(v.1) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 1995. In (A6.9) InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 2000, while Trust is Interpersonal Trust(v.2) and Inst. is Quality of 
Government in 2000.  
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 Table A7: More Sample Restrictions. 
 
 (A7.1) (A7.2) (A7.3) (A7.4) (A7.5) (A7.6) (A7.7) (A7.8) 
Dep. Variable Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
InitInc -1.596 -1.466 -3.509 -3.620 -1.935 -1.967 -3.782 -0.830 
 (3.23)** (2.72)* (6.68)** (6.57)** (4.09)** (3.49)** (2.66)* (1.24) 
InvPrice -0.021 -0.024 0.003 0.007 -0.020 -0.019 -0.012 -0.030 
 (2.87)** (2.73)* (0.41) (0.86) (2.89)** (2.22)* (2.06)+ (2.50)* 
LifeExp 0.024 0.014 0.198 0.231 0.015 0.015 -0.077 0.001 
 (0.50) (0.27) (3.06)** (3.35)** (0.33) (0.28) (0.82) (0.01) 
Trust 18.762 11.231 6.994 6.487 17.771 17.620 80.896 3.938 
 (3.87)** (1.62) (2.62)* (2.33)* (4.21)** (3.75)** (1.89)+ (0.38) 
Inst 9.322 6.397 4.474 5.400 9.151 9.175 31.960 3.840 
 (4.52)** (2.10)* (4.07)** (3.68)** (5.31)** (4.52)** (1.97)+ (0.85) 
Trust*Inst -16.924 -5.306 -10.450 -13.357 -15.306 -15.122 -79.855 5.526 
 (3.04)** (0.56) (2.96)** (2.56)* (3.18)** (2.71)* (1.85)+ (0.32) 
Constant 8.739 10.303 19.050 17.675 12.580 12.733 15.141 7.692 
 (2.94)** (2.97)** (5.06)** (4.42)** (4.36)** (3.93)** (1.87)+ (2.75)* 
Trust (version) (v.1) (v.1) (v.5) (v.5) (v.1) (v.1) (v.1) (v.1) 
Institutional 
Measure 
Quality of 
Government 
Quality of 
Government 
Composite Contract 
Enforcement 
Composite Contract 
Enforcement 
Quality of 
Government 
Quality of 
Government 
Quality of 
Government 
Quality of 
Government 
Sample Inst>p10 Inst>p10 & 
Inst<p90 
Inst>p10 Inst>p10 & Inst<p90 InitInc>p10 InitInc>p10 & 
InitInc<p90 
OECD Non-OECD 
N 41 32 54 47 42 36 21 25 
R2 0.73 0.76 0.57 0.59 0.75 0.74 0.67 0.80 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In all regressions InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995.  
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 Table A8: Countries included in the regressions. 
 
Country (A3.6) (A3.5) (4.5) World Bank Income Region Trust (v.2) Inst. 
Australia 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.40 0.94 
Austria 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.32 0.89 
Canada 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.52 1.00 
France 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.23 0.78 
Germany 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.35 0.87 
Japan 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.44 0.78 
Netherlands 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.53 1.00 
Switzerland 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.41 0.94 
United States 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.44 0.89 
Belgium 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.33 0.79 
Iceland 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.44 1.00 
Ireland 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.47 0.78 
Italy 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.34 0.75 
Malta 1 1 1 High income: nonOECD 0.24 0.78 
Portugal 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.21 0.81 
Spain 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.33 0.74 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.44 0.94 
Argentina 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.20 0.69 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 Lower middle income 0.30 0.57 
Chile 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.23 0.75 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.27 0.75 
Hungary 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.25 0.85 
Korea, Republic of 1 1 1 High income: OECD 0.34 0.64 
Russia 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.30 0.31 
Slovak Republic 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.22 0.73 
Uruguay 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.22 0.50 
Venezuela 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.14 0.47 
Dominican Republic 1 1 1 Lower middle income 0.26 0.53 
Mexico 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.33 0.52 
Poland 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.29 0.64 
Romania 1 1 1 Lower middle income 0.16 0.47 
South Africa 1 1 1 Upper middle income 0.28 0.44 
Bangladesh 1 1 1 Low income 0.21 0.39 
India 1 1 1 Low income 0.36 0.64 
Nigeria 1 1 1 Low income 0.20 0.31 
Pakistan 1 1 1 Low income 0.21 0.44 
Denmark 0 1 1 High income: OECD 0.58 1.00 
Norway 0 1 1 High income: OECD 0.65 0.94 
Finland 0 1 1 High income: OECD 0.63 1.00 
Sweden 0 1 1 High income: OECD 0.66 1.00 
China 0 1 1 Lower middle income 0.56 0.49 
Brazil 0 0 1 Lower middle income 0.07 0.44 
Colombia 0 0 1 Lower middle income 0.11 0.34 
Turkey 0 0 1 Upper middle income 0.10 0.53 
Peru 0 0 1 Lower middle income 0.05 0.50 
Philippines 0 0 1 Lower middle income 0.06 0.56 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 High income: OECD 0.26 0.94 
New Zealand 0 0 0 High income: OECD 0.49 0.94 
Slovenia 0 0 0 High income: nonOECD 0.16 0.75 
Estonia 0 0 0 Upper middle income 0.28 0.75 
Greece 0 0 0 High income: OECD 0.24 0.69 
Lithuania 0 0 0 Upper middle income 0.31 0.56 
Belarus 0 0 0 Lower middle income 0.25 0.49 
Croatia 0 0 0 Upper middle income 0.22 0.68 
Latvia 0 0 0 Upper middle income 0.19 0.61 
Ukraine 0 0 0 Lower middle income 0.30 0.44 
Albania 0 0 0 Lower middle income 0.27 0.31 
Armenia 0 0 0 Lower middle income 0.25 0.36 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 Lower middle income 0.21 0.42 
El Salvador 0 0 0 Lower middle income 0.15 0.56 
Moldova 0 0 0 Low income 0.22 0.56 
All countries in this table are indluded in (5.5), and the column header (4.5) refers to the equation with that number and so on. 
Countries with a 1 in respective column are included in the regression with that number. Trust is Trust(v2), and inst is Quality of 
Government in 2000.  
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Table A9: Variable Descriptions. 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Source: 
Average Years of Schooling Average years of schooling of adults in 1995 (aged 15+) World Bank (2006a) 
bri_col British colony  CEPII (2006) 
Bureaucratic delays 1972-1995 Bureaucratic delays 1972-1995, BERI Teorell et al. (2006) 
Composite contract 
enforcement 
Composite court quality, calculated as the mean of the 
other three measures from World Bank (2006b) 
World Bank (2006b) 
Contract enforceability 1982-
89 
Contract enforceability, 1982-89, BERI La Porta et al. (1997) 
Cost of contract enforcement Cost to enforce contract (norm) in 2003 World Bank (2006b) 
Days for contract 
enforcement 
Time to enforce contract (norm) in 2003 World Bank (2006b) 
Abslat/Distance from 
Equator 
Absolute latitude in degrees CEPII (2006) 
Distcr Mean distance to coast or river Gallup et al. (2001) 
esp_col Spanish colony CEPII (2006) 
Ethnic Fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Ethnic Polarization (mean) ETH12POL Reynal-Querol (2006) 
fra_col French colony CEPII (2006) 
Government share of GDP Government Share of RGDPL in 1995 Heston et al. (2006) 
Growth Annual growth in GDP per capita1995-2005 World Bank (2006a) 
InitInc Log GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Laspeyres) Heston et al. (2006) 
Inst. /Quality of Government Quality of government, ICRG Teorell et al. (2006) 
InvPrice Price level of investment , PPP Heston et al. (2006) 
InvRate / InvRate (World 
Bank) 
Gross capital formation in 2000(% of GDP) World Bank (2006a) 
InvRate (Penn) Investment Share of RGDPL in 1995 Heston et al. (2006) 
legor_fr French legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
legor_sc Scandinavian legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
legor_so Socialist legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
legor_uk British legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
LifeExp Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Bank (2006a) 
Linguistic Fractionalization Linguistic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Openness as share of GDP Openness in Constant Prices in 1995 Heston et al. (2006) 
Procedures in contract 
enforcement 
Procedures to enforce contract(norm) in 2003 World Bank (2006b) 
prt_col Portugese colony CEPII (2006) 
Quality of public institutions, 
1982 
Quality of public institutions, 1982 Teorell et al. (2006) 
Religious Fractionalization Religious fract. Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious Polarization Rel pol Reynal-Querol (2006) 
Risk of Expropriation 1982-
1997 
Risk of expropriation 1982-1997, ICRG Glaeser et al. (2004) 
Secondary School Enrollment School enrollment, secondary (%gross) World Bank (2006a) 
State Antiquity State Antiquity by 1950, v3.  Putterman (2006) 
Telephone Mainlines Telephone mainlines in 1995 (per 1,000 people) World Bank (2006a) 
Trust (v.1) Interpersonal trust in survey 1990-95+96,97,81-89, imputed WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.2) Interpersonal trust in survey 1990-95+96-99,81-89, 
imputed 
WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.3) Interpersonal trust in survey 1981-95 WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.4) Interpersonal trust in survey 1990-95 WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.5) Interpersonal trust in survey 1981-2004 WVS (2006) 
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